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THE DESEGREGATION CASES: CRITICISM OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENTIST'S ROLE
KENNETH B. CLARKt
B ASIC TO THE DIRECT and indirect criticisms which have
been raised concerning the role of social scientists in the school
desegregation cases is the generally unstated question of the propriety
of social scientists playing any role in this type of legal controversy.
It is clear that the public school desegregation cases are crucially re-
lated to the delicate and specific problems of the relative status of the
Negro and white groups in American culture and the equally delicate
and general problem of social change. Before one attempts to discuss
the specific criticisms or the fundamental questions which they appear
to reflect, it might be valuable to attempt an analysis of the social
dynamics, the context within which such discussions seem either neces-
sary or desirable. Serious discussion of whether social scientists should
play a role in the legal processes related to the desegregation of the
public schools would seem no more or less justified than discussions
of the following questions:
Should social scientists play a role in helping industry function
more efficiently-make larger profits-develop better labor man-
agement relations-increase the sense of satisfaction among the
workers?
Should social scientists play a role in helping governmental agen-
cies and key policy makers make more effective and valid
decisions ?
Should social scientists play a role in attempting to solve the
many human and psychological problems faced by the military
arm of our government?
The psychological significance of the fundamental problem posed
by questioning the relationship between social scientists and the de-
segregation cases may be even more clearly illustrated by asking the
analogous question:
Should biological scientists play a role in guiding medical re-
search and practices?
tAssociate Professor of Psychology, City College of New York; co-founder and
Director of Research for Northside Center for Child Development, New York City;
Social Science Consultant to the legal staff of the NAACP. A.B. 1935, M.S. 1936,
Howard University; Ph.D. 1940, Columbia University.
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The answers to the above questions would seem so obviously
positive that one is forced to question the validity of the question which
is implicit in the criticisms which have been raised concerning the role
of the social scientists in the desegregation cases. In searching for
an answer, one must look in the direction of understanding the com-
plexity of the power structure of our society and particularly the
types of threats to the existing social structure which are inherent
in the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court which
ruled that racial segregation in public schools and other forms of
state-supported public accommodations violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.
These decisions must be seen as demanding fundamental changes in
the power alignments and group status patterns which prevail in our
society. The social scientists who collaborated with the lawyers who
argued and won these cases were certainly accessories to this demand
for a significant form of social change. They themselves might not
have been psychologically prepared to accept with equanimity the
directness of the involvement or the sweeping demand for social change
which the Court's decision precipitated. It is also possible that these
changes are not only contrary to the prevailing status hierarchy among
the racial groups in our society but also inimical to an important aspect
of the continued controlling power pattern of this society. If this is
true, the accessory role of social scientists in these decisions subjects
them to the criticisms of those who are identified with and seek to
perpetuate the racial status quo and the related power controls.
It may be, therefore, that the continued preoccupation of social
scientists and their critics with the question of whether they should
be involved in this phase of the legal processes reflect their anxiety
in the face of these criticisms; and reflects even more concretely the
possibility that these criticisms may lead to more punitive controls
of those social scientists who continue to identify themselves with
"controversial causes"-i.e., causes which threaten the prevailing power
alignments in the society.
Social scientists, like other knowledgeable individuals in our
society, must be sensitive to the problems of power and the techniques
of social control which are operative in the society in which they
work. In spite of the demand for objectivity and integrity in the search
for truth, the important determinant of serious scientific work, social
scientists are influenced indirectly and sometimes directly, subtly and
sometimes crudely, by the prevailing social biases and uncritically
accepted frames of reference of their society.
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Given this perspective, one can then begin to evaluate the specific
critcisms which have been raised against the social scientists who have
been involved in these desegregation cases. The implications of any
of these criticisms are not restricted to the more academic problems
of social science theory, methodology, and the nature of social science
evidence. Nor are they limited to the more complex problems of the
delicate relationship between the social sciences and the law. These are
indeed crucial problems which merit continuous discussion and debate
in the relatively young and dynamic social sciences. The full import
of a given criticism must be understood in terms of whether it clarifies
or distorts the larger social issues; specifically, the practical reality
of the nature, function, and consequences of racial segregation in Ameri-
can life, the stresses and strains inevitably involved in attempts to
change institutionalized patterns of social injustices, and the role of
the courts and other governmental agencies in the competition among
groups for changes in, or maintenance of, the status quo.
Some of the most intense criticisms have come from political
leaders of the deep southern states. Men like Senators Eastland and
Talmadge, former Governor Byrnes and Governor Faubus have at-
tacked the Supreme Court's decision not only on the grounds that it
violated "states rights" but also, significantly for the purposes of
this paper, on the grounds that it attempted to substitute psychological
and sociological theories for the law. There is a question whether
these types of criticisms should be taken seriously by social scientists
since they seem motivated largely by political considerations.
Attacks on the role of social scientists in these cases have not
been restricted to politicians who object to the Court's decision and
the social changes which they fear may result, but have come also
from serious students of jurisprudence and more recently from social
scientists. One of the most consistent of the legal critics is the dis-
tinguished professor of jurisprudence, Edmond Cahn, of New York
University Law School. Ernest van den Haag is an example of a
critic from within the field of social sciences. The bulk of this paper
will be devoted to an analysis of the criticisms of Professor Cahn
and Dr. van den Haag because Professor Cahn has undoubtedly in-
fluenced the thinking of other students of jurisprudence' and Dr.
van den Haag has presented the most specific and intense critical
comments that have so far been published by a social scientist.
1. See BLAUST8IN AND FERGUSON, DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 135-37 (1957).
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Edmond Cahn's Criticisms.
The criticisms of Professor Cahn take many forms. 2 Essentially,
however, he states that it is incorrect to believe that the Brown de-
cision' was "caused by the testimony and opinions of the scientists"
and that the constitutional rights of Negroes or any other Americans
should not "rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the scien-
tific demonstrations in these records." He contends that the cruelty
inherent in racial segregation "is obvious and evident."
Among his other charges are: (1) that this writer exaggerated
the contribution of social science experts to these cases; and (2) that
in writing a report of the role of social scientists which was published
before May 17, 1954, the writer could not have known that Chief
justice Warren's opinion would not mention either the testimony of
the expert witnesses or the statements submitted by the thirty-two
social scientists. Professor Cahn added solicitously:
"The Chief Justice cushioned the blow to some extent by citing
certain professional publications of the psychological experts in
a footnote, alluding to them graciously as 'modern authority.'
In view of their devoted efforts to defeat segregation, this was
the kind of gesture a magnanimous judge would feel impelled
to make, and we are bound to take satisfaction in the accolade."
In speculating on why the Court did not mention the social scientists'
brief in its opinion, Professor Cahn states his personal, subjective re-
action that the text of this statement conveyed little or no informa-
tion beyond what is known as "literary psychology." The fact is,
however, that all but one of the references cited by the Court in foot-
note 11 of the Brown decision were cited as references in the social
science brief which had been submitted to the Court. The one reference
which had not been listed but cited by the Court was Witmer and
Kotinsky's Personality in the Making, the relevant portion of which
was a summary of this writer's White House Conference manuscript
on the effects of prejudice and discrimination on personality develop-
ment.
Whatever might be one's degree of agreement or disagreement
with Professor Cahn's estimate of the worth of the social scientists'
testimony in these cases or the degree of the Court's regard for the
social scientists' material presented in the brief or in the trial records,
one must take seriously his argument that the constitutional rights
2. Cahn, Chapter on Jurisprudence, Annual Survey of American Law, 30 N.Y.U.
L. Rv. 150-69 (1955).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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of Negroes or other Americans should not rest on social scientists'
testimony alone. If he had concentrated and elaborated on this issue
on a high level of academic discourse, he might have made an im-
portant contribution to thought in a field in which he is competent.
When he leaves the area of the law, constitutional rights, and matters
of jurisprudence and invades the area of social sciences, making broad
and general comments about the validity of social science methods,
premises, approaches, findings and conclusions, and when he explicitly
or implicitly attacks or suggests that the social scientists who par-
ticipated in these cases as witnesses and consultants did not do so
with the utmost personal and scientific integrity, he gratuitously leaves
his field of competence and communicates his personal opinions, biases
and misconceptions as if they were facts. His prestige in a field in
which he has been trained thereby disguises his ignorances in a field
in which he has no training. For these reasons, it is necessary to an-
swer these charges and generalizations with clarity.
Some Relevant Facts.
Before one enters a general appraisal of the validity of some of
the many assumptions, implications, and charges raised by Professor
Cahn, it is necessary to clarify certain points of fact which are relevant
to opinions about the role of social scientists in these cases:
(1) The social scientists who participated in these cases
were invited to do so by the lawyers of the NAACP. It was
these lawyers who had the primary and exclusive responsibility
for developing the legal rationale and approach upon which these
cases would be tried and appealed. It was they who made the
decision to bring the legal attack on the problem of overruling
the Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine 4 by attempting to dem-
onstrate that state laws which required or permitted segregation
in public schools violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. It was their decision that the chances
of success would be greater if it could be demonstrated that
racial segregation, without regard to equality of facilities, dam-
aged Negro children. Furthermore, it was their decision to de-
termine whether they could find acceptable evidence from social
psychology and other social sciences which would support their
belief that psychological damage resulted from racial segregation.
Social scientists were not involved and did not participate in any
way in these initial and important policy or legal strategy de-
cisions. Only after these decisions were made by the lawyers of
the NAACP were the social scientists approached and invited
by the lawyers to participate in these cases. The social scientists
4. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
[VOL. 5 : p. 224
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were asked whether there were any relevant scientific studies
on the psychological effects of racial segregation. Finally, it was
the judgment of these lawyers that the studies and evidence
offered by the social scientists were relevant and crucial enough
to form an integral part of their trial and appellate case.
(2) The studies which were relied upon by the social scien-
tists in arriving at the conclusion that racial segregation damaged
the human personality were not studies which were conducted
specifically for these legal cases. Systematic research on the
psychological aspects of racial prejudice, discrimination, and seg-
regation had been going on for more than fifteen years. The
White House Conference manuscript, which was cited by the
United States Supreme Court in footnot 11 in the Brown de-
cision, was a compilation of all of the available knowledge of
the effects of prejudice and discrimination on personality devel-
opment in children and was prepared by this writer months be-
fore he was aware of the fact that the NAACP intended to bring
cases before the federal courts challenging the validity of segre-
gated schools.
(3) The studies cited in this White House Conference
manuscript and the joint primary research of this writer and
his wife formed the bulk of his testimony in three of these five
cases. The primary research studies were conducted ten years
before these cases were heard on the trial court level. Professor
Cahn's allegation that the writer served in the role of advocate
rather than that of an objective scientist in his participation in
these cases seems difficult to sustain in the face of testimony given
on the basis of research conducted ten years before these cases
were heard. One would have to be gifted with the power of a
seer in order to prepare himself for the role of advocate in these
specific cases ten years in advance.
(4) The use of the "Dolls Test" (actual dolls, not pictures
of dolls, were used in this research) on some of -the plaintiffs
was to determine whether the general findings from the larger
number of Negro children who had been tested years before
were true also for the children who were the actual plaintiffs in
these cases. The decision to test some of these plaintiffs was a
legal one made by the lawyers of the NAACP. It was their
assumption as lawyers that general scientific findings would have
more weight in a courtroom if it could be demonstrated that they
also applied in the specific cases and for the particular plaintiffs
before the court. When these plaintiff children were tested and
interviewed by this writer, it was his judgment that some of
these children showed evidence of the same type of personality
damage related to racial prejudice, segregation, and discrimina-
tion which was found in the larger number of subjects who were
studied in the original, published research. This opinion was
presented to the courts in the form of sworn testimony.
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(5) The justices of the federal district courts were at all
times free to rule that the testimony of the social scientists was
irrelevant and immaterial. The United States Supreme Court
could have refused to accept the Social Science statement which
was submitted to it in the form of an appendix to the legal brief
of the appellants. If either of these had been done, there would
now be no question of whether the courts did or did not reply
on the findings and opinions of social scientists.
It is still a matter of social reality that social scientific findings
and opinions are not incorporated into, nor do they determine, policy
decisions, legislative action, or judicial decisions except to the extent
that those who have the power to make these practical decisions choose
to accept or reject the relevant findings of scientists. Whether this
should continue to be so is, of course, debatable.
"Fidelity," "Truth," and Acadamic Courtesy.
Professor Cahn implies that the primary motive of the social
psychologists who participated in these cases was not "strict fidelity to
objective truth." This is a serious, grave, and shocking charge.
Professor Cahn did not present evidence to support his implica-
tion that the social scientists who participated in these cases, and
particularly this writer, betrayed their trusts as scientists. He merely
makes the assertion that some day judges will be wise and will be
able to notice "where objective science ends and advocacy begins."
For the present, however, "it is still possible for the social psycholo-
gists to 'hoodwink' a judge who is not overwise . ... "
It is difficult to take this type of comment seriously. Since it
has been published over the signature of an individual who commands
the respect of his legal colleagues, it cannot be dismissed. It cannot
be waived aside as evidence that Professor Cahn believes himself
wiser than the entire legal staff of the NAACP, the battery of lawyers
employed by the opposition-including the late John W. Davis, who
devoted a considerable amount of space in his Supreme Court brief.
and in his first arguments before the United States Supreme Court
to the social science testimony-or the lawyers of the Department of
Justice of the United States, and, finally, the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court.
This point must be answered by a description of concrete facts in
the relationship between the NAACP lawyers and the social scientists
who were involved in these cases. The social scientists who testified
in these cases or endorsed the Social Science appendix at the invitation
[VOL. 5 : p. 224
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of this writer were not the type of human beings who were capable,
personally or professionally, of testifying to a fact or stating an opinion
which they did not believe to be consistent with the scientific evidence
as they knew it. These men are neither infallible nor all-wise; but
they are the outstanding experts in this field. What is even more
important, they are men of integrity.
When the lawyers of the NAACP, in their understandable zeal
to develop the strongest possible case, asked the social scientists whether
it was possible to present evidence showing that public school segre-
gation, in itself, damaged the personalities of Negro children, it was
pointed out to them that the available studies had so far not isolated
this single variable from the total social complexity of racial prejudice,
discrimination, and segregation. It was therefore not possible to
testify on the psychologically damaging effects of segregated schools
alone. Such specific evidence, if available at all, would have to come
from educators and educational philosophers. Some of the more in-
sistent lawyers felt that only this type of specific testimony would be
of value to them in these cases. It was pointed out to these lawyers
that if this were so then the social psychologists and other social
scientists could not be of any significant, direct help to them. A care-
ful examination of the testimony of the social scientists, found in the
record of these cases and the Social Science appendix submitted to
the United States Supreme Court, will show that the social scientists
presented testimony, opinions, and information consistent with the
available empirical studies, conclusions, and observations. They pre-
sented this information with caution and restraint befitting their roles
as trained and disciplined scientists. As expert witnesses, they made
not a single concession to expediency, to the practical and legal de-
mands of these cases, or even to the moral and humane issues involved
as they adhered to their concept of "strict fidelity to objective truth."
Certainly Professor Cahn cannot be the judge of whether his con-
cept of "strict fidelity to objective truth" in the field of social science
is more acceptable or valid than theirs.
It must also now be stated that one of the responsibilities assigned
to this writer in his role of social science consultant to the legal staff
of the NAACP was to advise the lawyers not only about those studies
and individuals who were scientifically acceptable, but also to advise
and warn them away from studies and individuals of questionable
scientific repute. At least one well-publicized report on the damaging
effects of segregation on the personality of Negroes was not used in
these cases because it was the judgment of this writer, which was
8
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communicated to and accepted by the lawyers, that its methodology
was scientifically questionable, its selection of subjects and sampling
were clearly biased, and that its conclusions bordered on the sensational.
In short, it was believed that in spite of the fact that this study pur-
ported to present clear evidence in support of the hypothesis that racial
oppression damaged the personality of Negroes, its flaws and scientific
inadequacy were so clear it could not be defended in court.
It is difficult to determine precisely what Professor Cahn means
by "objective truth." According to his article "most of mankind
already acknowledged. . ." that segregation is cruel to Negro children,
involves stigma and loss of status, and may ultimately shatter their
"spines" and deprive them of self-respect. The "shattering of spines"
is Professor Cahn's contribution to the knowledge of the detrimental
effects of racial segregation. No social scientist testified to this "fact."
Professor Cahn contends, however, that when scientists attempt to
demonstrate these same "well-known facts" through their use of the
methods and approaches of science, they "provide a rather bizarre
spectacle." What is more, he maintains they exaggerate their role,
their methods are questionable, their logic and interpretation weak and
fallacious, and they distort their findings as they become advocates
who seek to "hoodwink" the judges. A serious question would be:
How could the social scientists be so unreliable yet nonetheless come
out with a picture of social reality which Professor Cahn and everyone
else "already knew" ?'
Professor Cahn presents a novel concept of the relationship be-
tween common knowledge and scientific knowledge. The logic of his
position rests upon the premise that science concerns itself with one
order of reality which is distinct from other forms of reality or truth
-that a scientific "fact" has different attributes or characteristics than
a "fact" of common knowledge. Another related theme which runs
through his comments is that a "legal fact" is distinct from both a
"scientific fact" and a "fact of common knowledge."
Cahn's pluralistic approach to the nature of "facts," while not a
novel philosophical position, seems to involve a mystical semantic
confusion which is inconsistent with the assumptions imperative for
5. It may be noted parenthetically that it is questionable whether all judges
share this "common knowledge," as is evidenced by the prior decision that upheld
the "separate but equal" doctrine. At any rate, Professor Cahn does not explain
why these judges did not act upon their knowledge. In fact, he does not explain
how a person not gifted with superior insights can determine what is and what
is not "common knowledge" as distinct from the personal biases of judges. Nor
does Professor Cahn suggest any means, other than through the medium of expert
witnesses, for getting "common knowledge," critically examined, into the court
record so that it may be considered by judges who have the responsibility for the
final decision.
[VOL. 5 : p. 224
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a scientific approach to the understanding of the nature of man, his
society, and his environment.
Science is merely the last of many approaches that man has used
in his attempt to determine the "facts" and truth of nature. As the
late Professor Einstein has observed: "Scientific thought is a develop-
ment of pre-scientific thought." Before and coincident with science,
man tried mysticism, religion, and philosophy in his attempts to de-
termine the facts of nature. In his quest to control his environment
and his relations with his fellow human beings, he attempted to im-
plement his various types of "knowledge" by seemingly compatible
techniques of control, e.g., magic, prayers, reason, law, and technology.
These various approaches in the quest of truth and the control of the
environment were not seeking different types of truth. Indeed, it must
be assumed that science and technology developed precisely because
earlier approaches to the nature of "truth" and "fact" left much to
be desired by way of successful demonstration of the practical utility
or the human consequences of these "truths" and "facts."
The development of science as an approach to the determination
of truth involved the development of methods for the control of errors
in human observation, judgment, biases, and vested interests. These
were the factors which seemed to have distorted man's concept of, or
blocked his contact with, the "truth" or "facts" of experience. When
they are operative, man's "common knowledge" becomes inconsistent
with "scientific knowledge." When they are controlled or for some
other reason non-operative, "common knowledge" and "scientific knowl-
edge" are coincident-both reflecting the nature of reality, truth, or
facts, as these are knowable to the human senses and intelligence.
Science is essentially a method of controlled observation and veri-
fication for the purpose of reducing human errors of observation,
judgment, or logic. Science begins with observation and ends by test-
ing its assumptions against experience. It is not a creation of another
order of reality. In a very basic sense there cannot be a "legal fact"
or a "fact of common knowledge" which is not at the same time a
"scientific fact." Whenever this appears to be true, one or the other
type of "fact" is not a fact.
The Basic Issue.
After one has cut. through the emotional irrelevancies of Professor
Cahn's article, one is confronted with the basic circuitous plea that
the law and the courts of the land should be isolated in Olympian
grandeur from the other intellectual and scientific activities of man.
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol5/iss2/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Specifically, Cahn seems primarily-even if unconsciously--disturbed
by the fact that the upstarts of the new social sciences should have
been involved at all in these important cases which belonged ex-
clusively to lawyers and students of jurisprudence. It is to be hoped
that a decreasing number of lawyers believe that laws and courts are
sacred and should be kept antiseptically isolated from the main stream
of human progress. Such isolation cannot be and never has been
true except in the classrooms of some puristic law school professors.
The law is concerned with society and the regulation of human
affairs. Social science, government, philosophy, and religion are also
concerned with society, its understanding and regulation. Man's re-
lations with his fellow man involve matters far too grave and crucial
to be left to lawyers and judges alone. Respect for the law, intelli-
gently and ethically conceived and executed, is essential for stable
government. Intelligence and ethics cannot stem from the law alone
but must be fed to it through the ceaseless struggles of scholars,
scientists, and others toward truth and understanding. This may be
difficult for Professor Cahn to accept. It nonetheless remains a fact.
As Brandeis once said: "A judge is presumed to know the ele-
ments of law, but there is no presumption that he knows the facts." 6
With the vast range and types of cases which come before the courts,
it is unlikely that even the wisest judges and lawyers could be compe-
tent in all fields of human knowledge. One may presume that it was
a recognition of these facts among others that influenced the decision
of the lawyers of the NAACP to seek the help of social scientists in
their attempt to overrule the Plessy v. Ferguson "separate but equal"
doctrine which had dominated civil rights litigation since 1896.
Another important fact which was ignored by Professor Cahn in
his castigation of the social scientists' role in these segregated school
cases was the fact that this was not the first time that the lawyers
of the NAACP had sought to convince the United States Supreme
Court that segregation in and of itself was unconstitutional. In the
Sweatt7 and McLaurins cases they sought a decision on the issue of
segregation per se by relying on the traditional legal approach. Sub-
stantially the same United States Supreme Court which handed down
the Brown and Boiling9 decisions, however, decided the Sweatt and
McLaurin cases within the framework of the Plessy "separate but
6. MASON, BRANDEIs, A FREZ MAN'S LimE (1946).
7. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
8. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
9. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (decided the same day as the Brown
decision). The Court held segregated schools in the District of Columbia to be
unconstitutional.
234 [VOL. 5: p. 224
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equal" doctrine. It may merely be coincidental that the lawyers of the
NAACP succeeded in overruling the Plessy doctrine only after they
enlisted an impressive array of social science testimony and talent
and attacked this problem with this approach.
Another Point of View.
Some astute students of jurisprudence hold opinions on this issue
which differ from those presented by Professor Cahn. The late Alex-
ander Pekelis, in making his case for a jurisprudence of welfare, stated:
"A great many contemporary judicial decisions show this three-
fold leitmotif-awareness of freedom, confession of fallibility, and
quest for extra-legal guidance ....
"A participation of the social sciences in the development of a
welfare jurisprudence may bring the normative elements in social
science into the light of consciousness, and thus contribute to a
healthy development of social theory ....
"The economic and social facts of life, which legal realism has
taught us, have banished the belief that judicial decisions are
brought ready-made by constitutional storks . . . . Similarly, so-
ciety cannot be built upon judicial whim or expediency alone.
"We cannot turn back the clock. Social scientists (economists,
sociologists and psychologists) are with us for good, and are
going to remain in the very midst of government .... Judges may
and should become acquainted with the various non-legal disci-
plines .... A judge should know more about social studies pre-
cisely in order to acquire the conviction that they can furnish
no more certainty than constitutions, statutes or precedents." 10
It would be fatuous to argue that because there is difference of
opinion among eminent students of jurisprudence that, therefore,
judicial opinions should not be taken seriously. Of course there are
dangers involved in the use of science in any area of human activity.
There are undoubtedly some social scientists who might be willing to sell
their intelligence, training, and themselves to the highest bidder. There
are those who will be easily intimidated by the practical demands of
vested interests and men of power. There are those who will rationalize
their subservience by demonstrating their affluence and tough-minded
practicality--or even their scientific purity. But this is not new.
Science has nonetheless continued its advance and contributions to
the ethical and material progress of mankind.
10. Pekelis, The Case For a Jurisprudence of Welfare, 2 SOCIAL RESEARCH
No. 3, reprinted in 6 LAWYER'S GUILD R view No. 5 (1946).
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Ernest van den Haag's Criticism.
The most serious and significant forms of criticisms are those
which are now beginning to come from social scientists. Dr. Bruno
Bettelheim of the University of Chicago has publicly stated that there
is no scientific evidence that racial segregation damages the human
personality. More recently, Ralph Ross and Ernest van den Haag
published a book entitled THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY. The criticisms
by Dr. van den Haag must be seen as distinct from the criticisms of
politicians and students of jurisprudence. These are the criticisms
of a social scientist who bears the responsibility and must be held
to the rules of social science.
In an appendix to chapter 14 of THE FABRIC OF SOCIETY entitled
"Prejudice About Prejudice," Dr. van den Haag, who is responsible
for this section of the book, makes the following statements among
others:
"Whether humiliation leaves deep and lasting traces and whether
it increases the incidence of personality disorders among Negroes,
we do not know (nor do we know whether congregation would
obviate them)."
"It (the United States Supreme Court) did not depend on the
attempt of the social scientists to detect and prove the psychological
injuries by 'scientific' tests-which is fortunate for the evidence
presented is so flimsy as to discredit the conclusion . ..."
Dr. van den Haag then proceeds to repeat, with some elaborations,
Edmond Cahn's criticisms of the role of social scientists in the de-
segregation cases. According to van den Haag, although the Court
"did not depend" upon social scientists, "much weight was given cer-
tain 'generally accepted tests' which Professor Kenneth B. Clark under-
took with certain Negro children in a segregated school."
"Professor Clark tested sixteen children between the ages of six
to nine in Clarendon County, South Carolina, and elsewhere about
three hundred children. This number would be too small to test
the reaction to a new soap. Professor Clark seems not to have
made sure that his sample is unbiased . . . . It appears, finally,
that no attempt was made to compare the reactions of Negro
children in segregated schools with those of Negro children in
non-segregated schools . . . . He found then that the behavior
he had attributed to segregation in his testimony-rejection of
colored dolls by Negro children-occurs more often when children
are in non-segregated schools."
"Professor Clark presented drawings (K.B.C.) of dolls to the
children . . . . Professor Clark concluded that prejudice had led
[VOL. 5 : p. 224
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them (the Negro children) to identify white and nice; and even
to identify with the white dolls despite their own dark color."
"His general interpretation-that the identification of 'white' with
'nice' is a result of anti-Negro prejudice-is truly astounding . .. ."
"The 'scientific' evidence for the injury is no more 'scientific' than
the evidence presented in favor of racial prejudice .... We need
not try 'scientifically' to prove that prejudice is clinically injurious.
This is fortunate for we cannot."
In attempting to answer Dr. van den Haag's criticism of the
wisdom of the May 17, 1954, decision of the United States Supreme
Court and his criticism of the social science testimony which was pre-
sented to the federal courts at the trial level of these cases, one is con-
fronted with a difficult task. To those students who are familiar with
the facts of the Supreme Court's decision and the limited role of social
scientists in the cases which led to this decision, it will be apparent
that Dr. van den Haag's criticisms of this decision and the role of
the social scientists are not based upon his direct knowledge of the
facts. Either Dr. van den Haag did not read or did not understand
the basic documents which are relevant to a scholarly discussion or
criticism of these problems.
For example, he states that in its 1954 decision, the United States
Supreme Court not only prohibited compulsory segregation but re-
quired "compulsory congregation." A careful reading of this decision
reveals that nowhere does the Court demand what Dr. van den Haag
calls "compulsory congregation." And certainly the Court does not
attempt "to compel equal esteem of groups for each other." The Court,
after reviewing the legal background and precedence and after allud-
ing to the effects of state enforced segregation on the Negro plaintiffs,
concluded ".... that in the field of public education 'separate but equal'
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated ...
are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
In reference to his attack on the role of the social scientist and
particularly the role of the writer in these cases, it is equally clear that
Dr. van den Haag relied upon secondary sources for his "facts" and
published his critical analysis without reading the original reports of
these research studies and without reading the Appendix to the Appel-
lant's Briefs written by three social scientists and endorsed by thirty-
two outstanding research workers in the field of race relations in
America. Dr. van den Haag betrays himself by repeating a crucial
error which was first found in Professor Cahn's criticism of the role
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of social scientists in these cases. He repeats Cahn's error that "Pro-
fessor Clark presented drawings of dolls to the children." A reading
of the original reports of this research would have revealed that one
of the three methods used in this study was the presentation of actual
dolls rather than the drawings of dolls.
Dr. van den Haag contends that "Professor Clark tested sixteen
children between the ages of six and nine in Clarendon County, South
Carolina" and "elsewhere about three hundred children." He main-
tains "that this number would be too small to test the reaction to a
new soap." The record of the testimony in the Briggs case," reveals
that the results of the tests of those sixteen children were not presented
as an "unbiased" sample. It was clearly stated that these were the
results of the testing of the plaintiffs in these cases.
This writer's testimony in these cases was not based exclusively
on his own research findings but on his evaluation of the weight of
evidence from other investigations of this problem. The record states:
"I have reached the conclusion from the examination of my own
results and from an examination of the literature in the entire
field that discrimination, prejudice, and segregation have definitely
detrimental effects on the personality development of the Negro
child."
Dr. van den Haag's criticism of the "flimsy" nature of the scien-
tific evidence would have to be taken more seriously if he had ex-
amined carefully the nearly sixty references which were used as the
basis of the social science brief which was submitted to the United
States Supreme Court. If this were too arduous a task, then he could
have examined the seven references cited by the United States Su-
preme Court in footnote 11 of the Brown decision.
Further evidence that Dr. van den Haag did not read the orig-
inal reports of these research studies is found in his distortion of the
findings and interpretation of the results of the dolls test and other
methods which were used to explore the dynamics of racial identifica-
tion and preference in Negro children. He states categorically that
"Professor Clark concluded that prejudice had led them to identify
white and nice." At no point in the report of this original research
was this conclusion stated. In fact, the term "prejudice" was not used
in the article referred to by van den Haag as the source of his state-
ment. The preferences and identification of these Negro children
were interpreted in terms of conflicts in self-esteem and the types of
ego pressures which result when the attitudes of a larger society
negate the normal self-esteem needs of human beings. If Dr. van
11. Briggs v. Elliot, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (companion to the Brown case).
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den Haag had examined the original sources, he would have learned
that these studies were conducted more than ten years before the
authors had any knowledge that these findings could have any specific
practical use. Originally, these were studies in the relatively technical
and complex field of the determinants and dynamics of the develop-
ment of the concept of the self. He would have learned, also, that
nowhere in the reports of these early studies or in the social science
brief presented to the United States Supreme Court was it ever con-
tended that racial segregation, in itself, accounted for the observed
damage in the ego structure of these children. The social science
brief submitted to the United States Supreme Court was explicit
on this fact:
"In dealing with the question of the effects of segregation, it
must be recognized that these effects do not take place in a
vacuum, but in a social context. The segregation of Negroes in
the United States takes place in a social milieu in which 'race'
prejudice and discrimination exist. It is questionable in the
view of some students of the problem, whether it is possible to
have segregation without substantial discrimination .... The im-
bedness of segregation in such a context makes it difficult to dis-
entangle the effects of segregation per se from the effects of the
context."
In his insistence that "we need not try scientifically to prove that
prejudice is clinically injurious" and that this is fortunate "for we
cannot," Dr. van den Haag betrays a peculiar concept of science. The
assertion that we cannot prove, through the methods of science, the
personality damage associated with social humiliation, stigma, and
other forms of prolonged adverse social situations is a curious position
for a contemporary social scientist to hold.
Probably the most disturbing and revealing aspect of Dr. van den
Haag's criticism is the fact that an examination of other portions of
his book demonstrates that he maintains a double standard of what
he considers scientific objectivity and acceptable evidence. On the
one hand, he contends that the writer's work and findings were un-
scientific and based on a number of cases that "would be too small
to test the reaction to a new soap" and on the other hand, he accepts
and presents the sweeping conclusions of Rene Spitz based on an un-
stated total number of children. Whatever the merits or defects of
Spitz's work, the question still remains whether the following con-
clusions drawn by van den Haag are justified:
"The infant reaching the outside world after dreadful travail,
must be made to feel at home if he is to stay. Even the greatest
maternal comfort cannot replace what he has left behind."
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".. . It seems entirely possible that lack of maternal affection in
the first few years of life deals a blow which cannot be mended
later."
Dr. van den Haag seems to have one set of standards for the
scientific acceptability of findings concerning the effects of hospitalism
and maternal deprivation on infants and another set of standards for
findings concerning the effects of the total pattern of racial prejudice,
discrimination, and segregation on the personality development of
children. Nowhere does he reveal the basis for his judgment that
the evidence in the latter case is flimsy while the evidence in support
of the former can be accepted uncritically as he presents it.
Conclusions.
Those who attempt to use the methods of social science in dealing
with problems which threaten the status quo must realistically expect
retaliatory attacks, direct or oblique, and must be prepared to accept
the risks which this role inevitably involves. Attacks motivated by
understandable political opposition or the criticisms which reflect the
vested interest or limitations of other disciplines must be expected.
Differences of opinion and interpretation concerning the relative
weight to be given to the available evidence must, of course, be expected
among conscientious social scientists. In this latter instance, however,
certain fundamental rules of social scholarship, consistency and logic
must prevail if the controversy is to be intellectually constructive and
socially beneficial.
It is a fact that the collaboration between psychologists and other
social scientists which culminated in the Brown decision will continue
12
in spite of criticisms. Those who question the propriety of this col-
laboration will probably increase the intensity of their criticism-
particularly as social controversy and conflict increase. Nevertheless,
some social scientists will continue to play a role in this aspect of the
legal and judicial process because as scientists they cannot do otherwise.
They are obligated by temperament, moral commitment and their
concept of the role and demands of science. They will continue to
do so in spite of criticisms or threats. They will do so because they see
the valid goals of the law, government, social institutions, religion
and science as identical; namely to secure for man personal fulfillment
in a just, stable, and viable society.
12. A group of psychologists are now working with the lawyers of the NAACP
in an attempt to determine the most effective legal attack on the various types of
plans developed by some southern states in an attempt to evade the letter and spirit
of the Brown decision.
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